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This paper explores the role of global risk aversion (GRA) and its main determinants, 
US economic growth and the US government bond yield, in explaining developments in 
Latin American sovereign spreads. We find that GRA is significant and positively 
related to Latin American sovereign spreads and that its impact varies across countries 
and over time.  Those countries with the lowest risk, such as Chile, are more affected by 
GRA. Its relevance has also risen over time, particularly since the sharp change in the 
perception of risk stemming from the Enron scandal. Finally, an increase in both US 
economic growth and the US government bond yield are found to reduce sovereign 
spreads in most Latin American countries, while the opposite is true for US short-term 
interest rates. 
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1.  Introduction 
Sovereign spreads are crucial for emerging markets since bond financing has been used 
extensively in the last few decades and economic growth is closely associated with the 
magnitude of net capital flows (Calvo, Reinhart and Talvi, 2001). External sovereign 
bond financing (denominated in foreign currency) has been the first to develop in most 
countries, particularly in Latin America after the Brady bond rescheduling. 
 
The fact, it is a very important region for the sovereign bond market, accounting for half 
of the emerging countries’ sovereign bonds in 2001. 
Latin America saw a strong revival of capital inflows starting in 1990 after a long 
period of external financing constraints during the debt crisis of the 1980s. With only a 
brief interruption around the Mexican crisis in 1994-95, this resurgence continued until 
the Russian crisis erupted in 1998, when sovereign spreads skyrocketed. However, by 
the end of 1998, only three months after the peak of the Russian, sovereign spreads had 
narrowed, recovering most of their losses. The Brazilian devaluation of January 1999 
was no more than a brief interruption of this downward trend, which was again 
underway as early as March 1999. The Argentine crisis, which started in 2001, led to a 
sharp increase in spreads, particularly in Latin America, which started to revert in 
October 2002, after Lula’s won the Brazilian elections and the first signs of US 
economic recovery appeared. Sovereign spreads fell close to historically low levels 
although they started to increase again since the beginning of 2004 (Graph 1). 
 
Graph 1: 
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The volatility of sovereign spreads, together with the high dependence of Latin 
American countries on external bond financing, makes it particularly relevant for the 
region’s economic authorities to identify which are the main driving forces of spreads. 
Much effort has already been made in this direction but there is no consensus yet. For a 
strand of the literature domestic factors –i.e., economic fundamentals - are particularly 
relevant in determining a country’ sovereign spread. Another strand of the literature 
considers external factors more relevant, including global ones (such as international 
interest rates or global economic growth) or contagion. In this study we shall focus on 
one external factor, which has recently received much attention, as it is highly 
correlated with emerging countries’ sovereign spreads. This is the degree of global risk 
aversion (GRA).  
 
GRA is difficult to measure. A country’s sovereign spread captures the risk premium 
attached to the risk of default but also the degree of unwillingness to accept a risky 
asset. The latter may be unrelated to the actual default risk of that country but, rather, 
reflect factors such as the financial position of investors, liquidity risk in financial 
markets or investors’ risk appetite at that time. This very complex concept is generally 
proxied by the yield of US relatively high risk corporate bonds, commonly known as 
“high yield”. With the help of a theoretical benchmark proposed by Blanchard (2004), 
we shall assess empirically how important is GRA in explaining the developments of 
Latin American sovereign spreads. As a second step, we endogenize GRA, following 
Bernanke (1992), Bernanke, Gertler and Girlchrist (1998) and Gertler and Lown (2000). 
The main determinants of the high yield we concentrate on are the US economic growth 
and the interest rate on the US government bond, which happen to have long been 
considered important factors explaining Latin American sovereign spreads. In this way, 
apart from analyzing the role of GRA, we offer a more complete answer of how US 
interest rates influence Latin American sovereign spreads, a long debated question, 
which appears particularly interesting at the current juncture. 
 
2.  Review of the literature on determinants of sovereign spreads 
The interest in sovereign spreads has grown markedly in the last few years. A strand of 
the literature has concentrated in the determinants of default
, another on the 
phenomenon of contagion. Other authors have investigated the nature of the   4
determinants of sovereign spreads, either external or idiosyncratic. Given our paper’s 
objective, this review concentrates on the latter, given the objective of the paper.  
 
The first analysis of the determinants of emerging countries’ sovereign spreads is 
probably that of Edwards (1986), who looked into the primary issuance of bank loans 
for some emerging countries and secondary-market bond spreads for Mexico. A number 
of domestic fundamentals were found significant (the debt to GNP ratio, the debt to 
exports ratio and the real effective exchange rate with a positive sign; the investment to 
GNP ratio, the debt maturity and the reserves to imports ratio with a negative sign). As 
regards external factors, only the price of oil was included explicitly in the analysis and 
was found significant only in the Mexican case but with an unexpected sign (positive).  
 
A very influential paper is that of Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), although it 
does not concentrate on sovereign spreads but rather on capital inflows to Latin 
American countries. They find that increases in US short term interest rates were an 
important determinant of the reduction in capital inflows to the region.   
 
Fernández-Arias (1996) analyzed the channels through which lower international 
interest rates affect the cost of capital in emerging countries, using a model of 
international portfolio allocation. He shows that a lower US government bond yield 
reduces sovereign spreads and that its impact is larger than that of fundamental-related 
factors, with the only clear exception of Argentina.   
 
Cline and Barnes (1997) estimate a regression to explain Eurobond spreads for twelve emerging 
market countries and six industrial countries during 1992–96. The do not find any significant 
role for the US government bond yield.  
 
Min (1998) estimated a similar equation to that of Edwards (1986) with pooled data for 
the emerging countries’ primary bond market. He obtains similar results except for a 
number of additional relevant domestic fundamentals (the current account deficit, 
import growth and inflation, all with a positive sign). Only one external factor is found 
significant, the terms of trade with a positive sign, but not the price of oil or US short 
term interest rates. 
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Eichengreen and Mody (1998) look into the determinants of the level and differences of 
sovereign spreads and capital inflows for a set of emerging regions. A reduction in the 
US government bond yield is found significant in increasing the issuance of sovereign 
bonds by emerging countries and, through the larger supply, in reducing sovereign 
spreads.  On the other hand, Kamin and von Kleist (1999) obtain that the relationship 
between the level of US short term interest rate and emerging countries’ spreads is not 
significant. 
 
In another multi-country analysis, over a longer period (1994-1999), Arora and Cerisola 
(2000) estimate the level of sovereign spreads against the Federal Funds Rate, a proxy 
for market volatility and a set of solvency and liquidity control variables. They find 
evidence of a positive and significant effect of the US monetary policy (i.e., a more 
restrictive monetary policy raises sovereign spreads), with higher elasticities for some 
countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, and lower for others, such as Argentina. 
 
Herrera and Perry (2002) consider jointly the importance of US monetary policy and of 
GRA, proxied by the US corporate bond and allow for different short and long run 
effects. They obtain a negative short-run impact of the Federal Fund rate on Latin 
American sovereign spreads and a positive one in the long run. The relation with GRA 
(proxied with the corporate high yield) is positive both in the long and short run.  
 
Grandes (2003) finds that changes in the permanent component of several 
macroeconomic fundamentals account for the largest variation of Argentine, Brazilian 
and Mexican sovereign spreads, but contagion and external factors – particularly GRA - 
are also relevant.  
 
Dungey et al (2003) look in detail at the impact of GRA on emerging market debt in 
several crisis events. They decompose GRA in three factors: volatility, credit and 
liquidity risks and find that the Russian crisis was characterized by a sharp increase in 
global credit risk, while the relative size of global risk factors is mixed for the Brazilian 
crisis. 
McGuire and Schrijvers (2003), using principal factor analysis, show evidence of a 
single common factor – which can be interpreted as investors’ risk tolerance - 
explaining a large proportion of the common variation in emerging countries’ sovereign   6
bond spreads. This common factor accounts for one third of the total variation in daily 
spread changes, indicating that each country’s idiosyncratic conditions remain the most 
relevant determinant of spread movements. As for the relation with US government 
bond yields, the authors argue that their result can explain the evidence of a negative 
correlation between investors risk tolerance and the US government bond yield, to the 
extent that changes in investor risk tolerance and expectations of future growth 
prospects are procyclical. This work is the one that gets closer to our objective although 
with several differences. We move away from a pure statistical technique towards a 
structural model. This allows us to clarify, not only the relation between GRA and 
emerging countries’ sovereign spreads, but also between other important external 
factors very much related to GRA (US economic growth and the government bond 
yield) and sovereign spreads. 
 
Finally, observing that sovereign spreads are highly correlated with investors’ appetite 
for risk, Calvo (2003) suggests that once we account for this component, domestic 
factors are almost irrelevant in explaining sovereign spreads. Favero and Giavazzi 
(2003) comment on Calvo’s statement pointing to the fact that the correlation between 
the “appetite for risk” and sovereign spreads is not constant over time. As we shall show 
later, our results confirm Favero and Giavazzi’s statement. 
 
From this review of the literature (see summary in Table 1 below), it seems clear that no 
consensus emerges on the role of external determinants of sovereign spreads, 
particularly US interest rates GRA has been acquiring more importance over time 
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Table 1 
Author Sample
GRA (US corporate high 
yield) 
US long-term government 
bond yield US short term interest rates
Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) 10 Latin American countries n.t. n.t. + *
Fernández Arias (1995) 13 emerging countries n.t. + n.t.
Cline and Bernes (1997) 12 emerging countries n.t. n.s. n.t.
Min (1998) Latin America and Asia n.t. n.t. n.s.*
Eichengreen and Mody (1998) main emerging regions n.t. - n.t.
Kamin and Kleist (1999) large group of emerging countries n.t. n.t. n.s.***
Arora and Cerisola (2001) 11 emerging countries n.t. n.t. + **
Herrera and Perry (2002) pool of 7 Latin American countries + in s/t and + in l/t n.t. - in s/t and + in l/t **
Grandes (2003)  Argentina + n.s. n.s.**
Grandes (2003)  Brazil + - - **
Grandes (2003)  Mexico + n.s. +**
Uribe and Yue (2003)  7 emerging countries n.t. n.t. - in s/t and + in l/t  *
Dungey et al (2003) 9 emerging countries + (during Russian crisis) n.t. n.t.
McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) large group of emerging countries + n.t. n.t.
n.t.: not tested; n.s: not significant
-: negtive impact; +: positive impact
*:three-month Tbill rate used
** Federal Fund rate
*** one-year benchmark yield
Impact of GRA, US government bond yield, and US short term interest rates on Latin American spreads 
 
 
3.  Paper’s objective 
In this study we focus on one external factor, which is receiving increasing attention in 
different fora but has only recently in the literature of emerging countries’ sovereign 
spreads. This is the degree of global risk aversion (GRA), generally proxied with the US 
high yield corporate bonds. With the help of a theoretical benchmark proposed by 
Blanchard (2004), we assess empirically how important is GRA in explaining the 
developments of Latin American sovereign spreads in the last few years.  
As a second step, we endogenize GRA based on its main determinants. The theoretical 
and empirical literature attaches large importance to US growth and interest rates in 
explaining US corporate high yield, which also happen to be important factors Latin 
American sovereign spreads. This means that there are two channels through which US 
growth and US interest rates may influence sovereign spreads: a direct one and an 
indirect one (through their impact on GRA). With the help of an SVAR we shall try to 
disentangle the two effects. 
 
Finally, to provide additional evidence on the long-debated impact on US monetary 
policy, we also include US short-terms interest rates in the empirical analysis.   8
4.  Sample, data and stylized facts 
Comparable data on emerging countries’ sovereign spreads is generally scarce. The 
most widely used is offered by J.P. Morgan Securities, with relatively long time series 
of different daily indices. We choose the EMBI+, which includes external dollar-
denominated Brady bonds and other non-local currency-denominated bonds, such as 
euro- bonds, and loans, starting from May 1994. J.P. Morgan also produces an index of 
local currency-denominated bond paper (the Emerging Local Currency Index) but, we 
prefer to use foreign-currency denominated bonds since credit risk and local exchange 
rate risk are many times closely intertwined. Furthermore, the EMBI+ offers a relatively 
longer series than other J.P. Morgan emerging country bond indices.  
The EMBI+ is available for eight Latin American countries, namely those with the 
largest bulk of bonds held by non-residents. Tóese are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Although the EMBI+ is not available 
for Chile, we include it in the sample using the EMBI Global for this specific case
4. For 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela data is available from May 1994 onwards. 
The other countries have shorter series. Panama and Peru’s indices start in 1996, and 
Chile’s and Colombia’s as late as 1999.  This means that we have a total of nine 
countries with a variable time span, whose maximum length is May 1994-October 2003.  
 
Monthly data is used since it is the highest frequency for which we can find indicators 
of US activity. This implies transforming JPMorgan daily indices by averaging daily 
data. As forward looking indicators of US economic activity are preferred as potential 
determinants of financial variables, we choose the OECD leading indicator of US 
economic activity and the Conference Board confidence index to conduct robustness 
tests of the results. The US government high yield is proxied by the 10-year Treasury 
bond rate.  For the impact of US monetary policy included as a robustness test, we use 
the Federal fund rate. 
 
Finally, as previously mentioned, GRA is proxied by the US Baa corporate high yield. 
A lower rating yield, namely that of the junk bond, is also used. 
 
                                                 
4 The EMBI GLOBAL summarizes  total returns for U.S-dollar-denominated debt 
instruments (not only external ones).   9
5.  Some stylized facts 
Although its importance has only been highlighted in the recent literature, GRA (- 
measured by the high yield US corporate spread) - has always been closely and 
positively associated with Latin American sovereign bond spreads (measured by the 
Latin American EMBI + spread). During the period prior to the Russian crisis, both 
yields moved very close. After the peak of the Russian crisis, the high yield remained 
below the Latin American EMBI + spread until the first quarter of 2000 (see Graph 2 
below). Thereafter, the high yield hovered above the EMBI + until mid-2001 where 
they moved together, except for a few moths at end-2001 beginning 2002, where the 
high yield remained well above the Latin American sovereign spread. Interestingly, the 
latter period coincides with the peak of the Argentine crisis, which was associated with 
the decoupling of other Latin American sovereign spreads from the Argentine one (see 
the Argentine sovereign spread in the first top graph on the left in Appendix 2). The 
same pattern of an increasing US high yield started again in the third quarter of 2002, 
coinciding with the victory of the left-wing candidate, Lula, in the Brazilian elections. 
 
Graph 2: 
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As regards the determinants of GRA, Graph 3 shows a clearly negative co-movement 
between the US corporate high yield spread and the US 10 year government bond yield 
throughout the sample. From 1994 to the summer of 1998, the government bond yield 
was high and GRA was low. With the Russian crisis this relation reverted until mid-
1999, where the bond yield remained above the high yield but with a narrower 
difference than in previous years. As the US economy entered a recession in late 2000, 
the relation reverted again and so has it remained until today although the difference 
between the two has narrowed since 2003. 
 
Graph 3: 
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Graph 4 depicts the relation between the GRA and US economic growth, proxied by the 
OECD leading indicator of US economic activity. The relation is negative as for the US 
government bond interest rate. 
 
Graphs 5 and 6 illustrate the co-movement of Latin American sovereign spreads and the 
US economic growth and the US government bond yield, respectively (the same graphs 
are shown for each of the nine countries analyzed in Appendix 2). In both cases the 
relation appears to be negative but is less-clear cut than between these two variables and 
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Graph 4 
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Graph 6: 
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Finally, Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 1 shows the main statistics of the variables 
included in this analysis. Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela are the countries with the 
highest average sovereign spreads (measured by the mean and the median) while Chile 
has the lowest average spreads.  Finally, the bi-variate correlation (Table 3 of Appendix 
1) between GRA and each country’s sovereign spread is positive for all countries except 
Chile and Ecuador. Finally, the correlation between GRA and the OECD leading 
indicator or US activity is negative and relatively high, in the same way as that of GRA 
and the US government bond yield. 
 
6.  The role of GRA 
6.1 Empirical strategy 
As previously mentioned, we use Blanchard’s model as a basis to test empirically what 
has been the role of GRA in explaining Latin American spreads.  Although his model 
has a different goal, i.e., showing that monetary policy suffers from fiscal dominance in 
Brazil, it is also useful for our purpose since he decomposes the sovereign spread in two 
parts: that related to GRA and the probability of default stemming from other factors. 
As Blanchard argues, these are mainly the country’s fundamentals
5 although one could 
think of other external factors not related to the GRA, such as the terms of trade. We   13
shall, thus, refer to all these factors as the idiosyncratic part of the sovereign spread. The 
model can be summarized in the following testable equation: 
t i t t u a p s + + =
* θ       (1) 
 
where st is the semi-log approximation of the spread between the foreign-currency 
denominated sovereign bond in the Latin American country and the US risk free bond 
of the same maturity, after linearity has been assumed, pt is the probability of default 
and a is the inverse of the real rate of return of the foreign currency denominated 
sovereign bond and ut is the error term. 
 
An interesting testable hypothesis is drawn from the above equation, namely those 
countries with higher returns in their dollar-denominated sovereign bonds should be 
more influenced by factors different than GRA (i.e., idiosyncratic factors). This 
hypothesis is confirmed in our results. 
   
It is also important to note that the probability of default stemming from idiosyncratic 
factors is given not only by pt but by pt+ ut. This means that approximating the 
probability of default to p will only be correct if u is small. As Blanchard (2004) shows, 
this occurs only if capital flows are relatively elastic. Since there is no simple way out 
for this econometric problem, we will have to rely on the assumption of a large 
elasticity of capital flows. Another potential problem is that the estimate of a will be 
unbiased only if GRA (θ *) is uncorrelated with the residual (u). This is unlikely to be 
true in as far as an increase in GRA raises the probability of default. Unfortunately, 
there is no obvious instrumental variable to account for this problem. 
 
We use two estimation procedures to analyse the role of GRA in explaining sovereign 
spreads: (i) OLS correcting by autocorrelation as Blanchard (2004) does for the case of 
Brazil; (ii) an SVAR model based on Blanchard’s decomposition. An SVECM is ruled 
out since all variables are found stationary, I(0), after running  Advanced Dickey-Fuller 
tests. (see Table 4 in Appendix 1) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
5 Blanchard goes even further and argues that, in general terms, their information is summarized in the 
debt developments.   14
There are several advantages in using an SVAR model but probably the most important 
one for our purposes is that we can obtain the variance composition and compare short-
term and long-term effects. . To estimate the SVAR model we consider the following 
general structure, where  t e  is the vector of innovations and  t u  is the vector of structural 
orthogonal shocks. 
 
t t Bu Ae =         (2) 
 
We depart from the general form by restricting  the A matrix to be lower triangular and 














1      (3)   
 
By imposing such short term restrictions we are assuming that GRA is not correlated 
with the error term, as in the first estimation strategy. Note that b2 should be similar to 
the parameter a in equation 1 (i.e., the elasticity of the sovereign spread to GRA). Once 
b2  is obtained, we can easily decompose the sovereign spread in two factors: the one 
depending on GRA and the probability of default stemming from idiosyncratic factors. 




6.2  Differences in the role of GRA across countries and over time  
We obtain the elasticities of the sovereign spread to GRA with the two different 
estimation strategies described above (OLS and SVAR). There are hardly any 
differences between the two elasticities, which are always found significant for all 
countries investigated and relatively high, particularly in the countries considered to 
have a lower intrinsic risk, such as Chile (Table 1). Argentina, Venezuela and Ecuador 
have the lowest elasticities. 
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                                                          Table 1 
                          Elasticities of the Modified Spread to GRA 
Country SVAR  OLS 
Argentina 0.11  0.11 
Brasil 0.24  0.22 
Chile 0.45  0.43 
Mexico 0.24  0.29 
Venezuela 0.12  0.13 
Panama 0.19  0.23 
Ecuador 0.13  0.12 
Perú 0.24  0.25 
Colombia 0.22  0.26 
   
 
From the SVAR estimation, we can obtain the variance decomposition, at different 
periods of time (months), for the sovereign spread of each Latin American country 
analysed (see Table 2). Large differences appear over time and across countries. In line 
with the results found for the elasticities, Argentina, Venezuela and, to a lower extent, 
Ecuador are the countries for which the GRA is less important in determining Latin 
American sovereign bond spreads (5%, 6% and 12% of the variance in the first month, 
respectively). In addition, the relevance of GRA increases over time for the three of 
them, particularly for Argentina. Interestingly, these are the countries with the highest 
average sovereign spread (so probably with the highest risk), as mentioned in the 
stylised facts. Exactly the opposite happens in the case of Chile, where the GRA 
explains a large part of the variance at the beginning (37% in the first month) but its 
relevance is largely reduced over time.   
                                                                                                                                               





Variance Decomposition: SVAR estimation 
 
 Argentina    Brazil    Chile  
  Period  GRA Idiosyncratic  GRA  Idiosyncratic  GRA Idiosyncratic 
1 5  95  14 86  37  62 
3 4  96  19 81  34  66 
6 6  94  21 79  21  79 
12  15 85  26  74  21 79 
24  33 67  31  69  17 83 
36  42 58  33  67  15 85 
           
  Mexico   Colombia  Venezuela   
  Period  GRA  Idiosyncratic GRA  Idiosyncratic GRA  Idiosyncratic 
1  16  84 40  60 6  94 
3  11  89 44  56 4  96 
6  8  92 43  57 4  96 
12  9  91 41  59 6  94 
24  14  86 42  58 10  90 
36  18  82 42  58 11  89 
           
  Peru   Ecuador   Panama   
  Period  GRA  Idiosyncratic GRA  Idiosyncratic GRA  Idiosyncratic 
1  28  72 12  88 18  82 
3  35  65 10  90 23  77 
6  35  65 16  84 25  75 
12  36  64 20  80 34  66 
24  36  64 23  77 39  61 
36  36  64 24  76 40  60 
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These results are in line with what one should expect from our theoretical framework, 
where the elasticity of GRA (the coefficient a) was defined as the inverse of the real 
rate of return of the domestic sovereign return. A plausible interpretation for this 
development (namely that the countries with the highest idiosyncratic risks are the ones 
least affected by GRA in the short run and most in the longer-term) is that the evolution 
of GRA slowly feeds into their relatively weaker fundamentals.  
 
Another interesting issue is the increasing importance of GRA over time. The Graphs 
below show the decomposition of each country’s sovereign spread into the part 
explained by GRA and that related to other factors. The former increases over time in 
practically all countries although it is still low in many of the Latin American countries 
analyzed, particularly in those considered the riskiest, as found for the variance 
decomposition.  
 
The larger importance of GRA over time can be explained by the increasing integration 
of emerging countries’ sovereign bonds in investors’ portfolios. As Wooldridge, 
Domanski and Cobau (2003) argue, the range of investors purchasing emerging market 
securities has broadened. While in the early-mid 1990s, mostly specialized investors, 
such as hedge funds and mutual funds, purchased these securities, today investors who 
traditionally invested in industrial countries debt also acquire this kind of paper. This 
includes pension funds, insurance companies and other institutional investors. This 
cannot but increase the interrelation between high yield corporate paper and emerging 
countries’ sovereign bonds. 
 
Finally, the set of graphs below show a relatively smaller contribution of GRA to 
explaining sovereign spreads during difficult periods. This is in line with the previously 
mentioned intuition by Favero and Giavazzi (2003). Difficult periods can be found for 
several countries, such us the Venezuelan banking crisis of 1994-95, the Mexican crisis 
of end 1994-95, the Ecuadorian crisis of 1999-2000 and the Argentine crisis of 2001-02. 
It is also the case of Brazil in 1999 and 2002, but to a lesser extent.  
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Set of graphs: 































































































6.3  Robustness tests to the definition of GRA 
Latin American countries are not only different in terms of average spreads but also in 
terms of their ratings. This is particularly interesting in the case of investment grade 
ratings since the bonds of those countries can be part of global funds and not only of 
higher risk, emerging market, funds. Until now, we have used the yield of investment 
grade paper to proxy GRA, namely Baa US corporate paper as proxy for GRA. We now 
test whether the explanatory power of the GRA is higher –particularly in the riskier 
countries with lower ratings – when a lower-rating US corporate paper is used as a 
proxy, namely junk bonds. Interestingly the junk bond yield has a much poorer 
explanatory power of sovereign spreads, even in the case of the riskier countries (Table 
4).   
Table 4 
Two different proxies for GRA: elasticities of the sovereign spread   
 Countries 
 
BBA US bond yield 
 
Junk bond yield 
 
Argentina 0,11  0,03 
Brasil 0,24  0,07 
Chile* 0,48  0,15 
México* 0,24  0,06 
Venezuela 0,12  0,02 
Panama 0,19  0,04 
Ecuador 0,13  0,04 
Peru 0,24  0,06 
Colombia 0,22  0,04 
* indicates investment grade countries 
 
6.4  The Enron case 
The Enron case has received enormous attention, not only due to its implication on 
corporate governance, but also on emerging countries’ sovereign bonds. In fact, 
corporate high yields increased sharply after the ENRON event in May 2002 and 
sovereign bonds in emerging countries followed exactly the same pattern.   
 
We use Blanchard’s decomposition again (dividing sovereign spreads in the part due to 
GRA and the idiosyncratic one) to assess what may have been the impact of the Enron 
event on the sovereign spreads of Latin American countries. To this end, we shorten the   20
sample to the period of interest, from the Enron event until its effect started to fade 
away, for the upturn (i.e. from May 2002 to September 2002), and from then until our 
last available observation for the downturn (i.e. from October 2002 to October 2003). 
Table 5 shows that the part of the sovereign spread related to GRA increased by 84 
basis points (b.p.) in Chile during the upturn period while the part related to 
fundamentals increased by only 3 b.p. The total increase of the sovereign spread was, 
thus, 88 b.p. While this was the lowest increase in terms of b.p. for all countries 
reviewed, the importance of GRA was the largest (96% of the total increase in the 
upturn). A similar result is found during the downturn, where the total reduction in the 
Chilean sovereign spread was 124 b.p., 117 b.p. of which were directly related to the 
lower GRA. Argentina´s results must be taken with caution or even be disregarded 
because the country was in default during the full period included in the analysis. In 
general, the relevance of GRA during this Enron-period appears to be larger than for the 
full sample, based on the variance decomposition. These results support the idea that the 
role of GRA in explaining sovereign spreads varies over time. In particular, it seems to 
increase when a large shake in risk aversion occurs. 
 
Table 5 
Impact of GRA after Enron’s default 
Enron Case: Impact on Sovereign Spreads 
(in basis points) 
   Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico  Peru  Venezuela
Spread (Total) 
Upturn 1646  1478  88  490  186  377  236 
Downturn -601  -1679  -124  -608  -235  -546  -422 
Spread (idosyncratic part) 
Upturn 518  614  3  175  58  124  91 
Downturn 372 -699  -7  -219  -75  -199  -200 
Spread (GRA) 
Upturn 1128  864  84  315  128  253  141 
Downturn -972  -980  -117  -389  -160  -347  -222 
% due to GRA 
Upturn 68,5  58,5  95,5  64,3  68,8  67,1  59,7 
Downturn 161,7  58,4  94,4  64,0  68,1  63,6  52,6 
Upturn of US high yield: (may 2002 - September 2002) 
Downturn of Us high yield: (October 2002 - October 2003) 
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7.  The impact of US growth and US interest rates on sovereign spreads 
7.1 Endogenizing GRA 
We now move to endogenizing GRA, following Bernanke (1992) and Bernanke, Gertler 
and Girlchrist (1998). These authors stress the role of the "external finance premium" in 
the quantitative accelerator mechanism for the US economy. Later, Gertler Lown (2000) 
use the corporate bond yield spread as a proxy for this premium. We depart from this 
model by adding a stochastic term, to the "external finance premium". This should 
capture the part of GRA non-explained by fundamentals. The GRA is, thus, determined 
as follows: 
[]
θ ψ θ u k q n t t t + + − − = ) (
*    (4) 
 
This shows that risk premium is inversely proportional to the balance sheet strength of 
companies net wealth (n) minus the gross value of capital (q+k), plus a stochastic term 
which captures the pure risk aversion component u
0. We consider the net wealth of 
companies to be a linear function of the aggregate real level of activity, as shown below: 
  
t t y b n 1 =    (5) 
 
We also assume the gross value of capital to be positively related to the aggregate level 
of activity and negatively to the risk-free interest rate. 
 
*
3 2 t t t t i b y b k q − = +    (6) 
 
We substitute equations (5) and (6) in (4) to obtain: 
 
θ ψ ψ θ t t t u i b y b b + − − − =
∗
3 2 1
* ) (    (7)   
 
The sign of the relation between GRA, US economic growth and the risk-free interest 
rate will, thus, depend on the elasticity of GRA to the net wealth of enterprises minus 
the value of their capital (ψ ). It will also depend on how important is US growth for the 
net wealth of enterprises as compared to its importance for the value of their capital   22
() 2 1 b b − . Finally, it will also hinge on how much the risk free rate affects the value of 
capital () 3 b .   
 
On the basis of this theoretical framework, we expect the parameter of US growth 
( () 2 1 b b − −ψ ) to be negative. The existing empirical literature confirms a highly 
significant negative relation between the US high yield and economic growth (Mody 
and Taylor, 2003 and Huanh, and Kong, 2003). In the same way, the sign of the 
parameter for the risk free rate ( 3 b ψ − ), proxied by the US government bond yield, has 
been found to be negative in several studies (Duffe (1996) and Huanh and Kong, 2003). 
Morris, Neals and Rolph (1998) confirm this negative relation in the short run but the 
effect is reversed in the long run. 
 
7.2  Empirical strategy 
We introduce the US economic activity and the US government bond yield, together 
with the GRA and the sovereign spread in a more complete SVAR model (a four 
variable model) to determine empirically what is the role of US economic growth and 
interest rates both though their direct influence on spreads and their indirect one (on 
GRA). To estimate the SVAR model we consider again the general structure, where  t e  
is the vector of innovations and  t u  is the vector of structural orthogonal shocks. Again, 
we restrict the A matrix to be lower triangular and B to be a diagonal matrix, so that the 
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θ θ  (8) 
In the first equation the US Growth is exogenously determined. The second equation 
models the  US monetary policy reaction function, which is a function of domestic 
economic growth. The third equation models the behaviour of GRA, on the basis of 
equation 7. GRA is, thus, a function of US growth (c4), the risk free rate (c5), and the 
pure aversion component (c6) . In the fourth equation we assume that US growth, the US 
risk free rate, and GRA affect the spread (through c7, c8 and c9, respectively). In sum,   23
US growth and the risk free rate influence both GRA - and indirectly the sovereign 
spread (though c4 and c5,, respectively) - and the sovereign spread directly (through c7 y 
c8).  
 
We first show the results for the case in which the risk free rate is proxied by a long-
term interest rate, namely the 10-year US government bond yield (Table 6). The direct 
impact of US economic growth (c7) is negative, as expected, for all countries’ analysed 
and significant in all countries but Argentina. The indirect effect (c4) is also negative but 
not significant for each of the countries in the sample. As for the US government bond 
yield, the indirect impact (c5) is always negative and significant for all countries except 
Ecuador. The direct impact (c8) -the one generally analysed in the literature- is also 
negative and significant  in three countries (Chile, Mexico and Colombia).  Impulse 
response functions can be found in Appendix 4 for each of the countries considered, so 




In sum, GRA and US economic growth and the government bond yield are clearly 
important external factors determining sovereign spreads of Latin American countries. 
The GRA and US economic growth have the expected sign. The result for the US 
 
SVAR of US growth 
1/, US government bond yield 
2/,  
GRA and Latin American sovereign spreads 
   Argentina Brazil  Chile Mexico  Peru  Venezuela  Panama Colombia  Ecuador
                              
  C2  0.074** 0.059** 0.101** 0.078** 0.080** 0.072** 0.068** 0.102**  0.076**
  C4       -0.007   -0.009  0.001  -0.005  -0.004       -0.003   -0.006     -0.012  -0.008
  C5  -0.287** -0.283** -0.416** -0.296** -0.375** -0.283** -0.353** -0.362**  -0.318**
  C7       -0.006  -0.025**  -0.018*  -0.019** -0.017** -0.013** -0.012* -0.011**  -0.012**
  C8       -0.026   -0.015  -0.146** -0.087** -0.040       -0.010   -0.050       -0.047*      -0.011
  C9         0.099  0.197**  0.224** 0.138** 0.189**         0.096*  0.143** 0.129**  0.127**
  C1  0.875** 0.867** 1.043** 0.844** 0.915** 0.842** 0.883** 1.026**  0.906**
  C3  0.206** 0.201** 0.192** 0.207** 0.212** 0.208** 0.203** 0.203**  0.204**
  C6  0.094** 0.095** 0.107** 0.094** 0.106** 0.093** 0.101** 0.107**  0.096**
  C10  0.062** 0.068** 0.070** 0.063** 0.054** 0.052** 0.052** 0.034**  0.045**
Log likelihood  130.149 122.729 41.193 132.972 85.757 152.892 109.297 75.472 148.041
                    * Significant at 10% level 
                  ** Significant at 5% level 
                             1/ Proxied by OECD leading indicator 
                             2/ 10 year government bond interest rate   24
government bond yield is in line with Eichengreen and Mody (1998) but not with 
Fernandez Arias (1995).  
 
To explore the impact of the risk free rate further, we include US short-term interest 
rates instead of long ones as a proxy. We, thus, focus on how the US monetary policy 
may affect sovereign spreads, proxying it with the Federal Fund rate. The results, which 
can be found in Table 7, offer a very different result than for the US long-term rates. 
Both the direct effect and the indirect one (through GRA) are positive and significant in 
a number of countries (Venezuela and Colombia for the direct effect and Brazil, 
Mexico, Peru, Panama and Ecuador for the indirect one). Such harmful effect of a tight 
monetary policy in the US on Latin American sovereign spreads is in line with Arora 




SVAR of US growth 
1/, US short term interest rate 
2/, GRA and Latin American 
sovereign spreads 
   Argentina Brazil  Chile  Mexico Peru  Venezuela  Panama  Colombia  Ecuador 
                   
  C2  -0.029**  -0.035**  -0.051**  -0.028**  -0.020  -0.029**     -0.026*      -0.028*  -0.033** 
  C4        -0.023*   -0.020  -0.075**  -0.024**  -0.036**  -0.025**      -0.034**  -0.060**  -0.034** 
  C5        0.148     0.179*    0.174     0.168*  0.296**         0.140       0.286**       0.160  0.230** 
  C7       -0.010  -0.020**  -0.022*  -0.023**   -0.012*        -0.007    -0.008       -0.006    -0.008 
  C8        0.077    0.007   0.050   -0.003   -0.018         0.080*     0.073  0.139**     0.066 
  C9  0.104**  0.228**  0.320**  0.190**  0.238**        0.094*  0.151**  0.196**  0.114** 
  C1  0.904** 0.878**  0.922**  0.840**  0.948**  0.874** 0.910**  1.098**  0.900** 
  C3  0.115** 0.115**  0.143**  0.114**  0.119**  0.113** 0.113**  0.118**  0.101** 
  C6  0.111** 0.110**  0.124**  0.110**  0.125**  0.109** 0.117**  0.116**  0.112** 
  C10  0.060** 0.070**  0.059**  0.066**  0.055**  0.054** 0.059**  0.032**  0.048** 
Log likelihood   167.380 156.154  56.716  168.146  105.160  185.013 124.080  88.575 187.621 
  * Significant at 10% level 
  ** Significant at 5% level 
 
1/ Proxied by OECD leading indicator 
           
2/ Federal Funds rate 
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Finally, robustness tests are conducted using a different leading indicator of US 
economic growth, namely the Conference Board confidence index. The results hardly 
change both when the US government bond yield proxies the risk free rate (Table 1 in 
Appendix 3) or when the Federal Fund rate is chosen (Table 2 in Appendix 3). 
 
8.  Conclusions 
In this study, to explain the sovereign spreads of nine Latin American countries, we 
have focused on the role of one external factor, which has acquired considerable 
importance in recent times, namely global risk aversion (GRA). With the help of the 
theoretical benchmark proposed by Blanchard (2004) and endogenizing GRA following 
research by Bernake, Gertler and co-authors, we assess empirically how important is 
GRA, and its main determinants, in explaining the developments of Latin American 
sovereign spreads. The main determinants of GRA, US economic growth and the US 
government bond yield, are also generally considered important factors explaining Latin 
American sovereign spreads. This implies that they are two potentially relevant 
channels for US growth and the US government bond yield to affect sovereign spreads, 
a direct and an indirect one (through GRA).  
 
We find that GRA is a relevant determinant of Latin American sovereign spreads, 
particularly for those countries with lower risk. Using two different estimation 
techniques (OLS and SVAR), the elasticities to GRA range from 0.11 in the case of 
Argentina to 0,45 in the case of Chile. The variance decomposition from the SVAR 
estimation confirms that the countries perceived as riskiest are the least influenced by t 
GRA and the opposite is true for the least risky ones. We also test for different proxies 
of GRA and find that the one with the largest explanatory power is the most frequently 
used in the literature (namely the US Baa corporate paper), independently on the risk of 
each Latin American country. 
 
A specific case of a sharp change in GRA is analyzed, namely the Enron collapse. We 
find that, since the Enron collapse, GRA explains more of the change in Latin American 
sovereign spreads, in basis points, than for the full sample. This seems to indicate that 
the explanatory power of GRA has increased over time. This might change in the future 
if the risk appetite of investors becomes less of an issue but it could also remain very 
important if the incorporation of emerging countries’ sovereign bonds in the same   26
investment funds as the US high yield bonds continues, in line with Wooldridge, 
Domanski and Cobau’s (2003) argument  
 
As for the role of US economic growth and the interest rate of US government paper, 
the two appear to reduce Latin American spreads in practically all countries. However, 
the opposite is found for US short- term interest. These results seem particularly 
important in the current juncture, where Latin American spreads have started to increase 
again after having reached historically low levels. At the same time the US corporate 
high yield remains at very low levels not withstanding the sudden increase in US 
government bond yields, following expectations of hikes in the Federal fund rate. 
 
There are concerns among Latin American policy makers on an increase in US interest 
rates as the US economy recovers and inflation expectations come back to the forefront. 
Our results point to the idea that a rise in the US long-term government yield might not 
constitute a large problem for Latin American sovereign spreads as long as the leading 
indicators of US growth remain strong, and GRA and US short-term rates remain low. 
The latter, however, is especially unlikely in the present circumstances.   27
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 Mean 3.96 1.41 5.71 4.50 2.18 5.16
 Median 4.86 1.93 5.80 5.25 2.12 4.94
 Maximum 12.96 3.63 7.96 6.50 3.79 10.18
 Minimum -6.56 -2.00 3.33 1.00 1.29 2.37
 Std. Dev. 4.49 1.60 1.03 1.70 0.65 2.01




Main statistics of dependent variables * 
Arg Bra Chi Col Ecu Mex Pan Per Ven
 Mean 17.21 8.79 1.56 6.07 15.75 5.23 4.2 5.55 10.51
 Median 7.69 8.11 1.61 5.93 13.52 4.1 4.25 5.45 9.6
 Maximum 67 19.66 2.27 9.21 44.32 18.55 6.15 9.46 22.26
 Minimum 2.89 3.75 0.45 3.8 5.34 2.09 2.43 2.84 3.07
 Std. Dev. 19.39 3.25 0.44 1.26 8.81 2.81 0.78 1.34 4.47
 Observations 114 114 54 54 114 114 88 80 114



















Latin Arg Bra Chl Col Ecu Mex Pan Per Ven
US lead ind CB 1.00 0.89 0.24 -0.16 -0.37 -0.52 0.00 0.17 0.11 -0.25 -0.16 0.34 0.23 -0.08 -0.37 -0.03
US lead OECD 0.89 1.00 0.13 -0.32 -0.40 -0.69 -0.18 0.22 -0.14 -0.50 -0.49 0.13 -0.02 -0.38 -0.62 -0.10
US 10Yr Rate 0.24 0.13 1.00 0.84 -0.78 -0.35 -0.45 -0.81 -0.45 0.61 0.12 0.69 0.50 0.06 0.07 -0.49
US Fed Fund R. -0.16 -0.32 0.84 1.00 -0.63 -0.12 -0.46 -0.91 -0.41 0.79 0.37 0.61 0.54 0.30 0.32 -0.47
GRA BAA -0.37 -0.40 -0.78 -0.63 1.00 0.79 0.72 0.69 0.67 -0.17 0.29 -0.59 -0.37 0.15 0.36 0.50
GRA Junk  -0.52 -0.69 -0.35 -0.12 0.79 1.00 0.65 0.26 0.60 0.35 0.61 -0.30 -0.13 0.37 0.67 0.33
Latin 0.00 -0.18 -0.45 -0.46 0.72 0.65 1.00 0.48 0.89 0.06 0.41 -0.20 0.17 0.48 0.53 0.56
Arg 0.17 0.22 -0.81 -0.91 0.69 0.26 0.48 1.00 0.56 -0.69 -0.11 -0.52 -0.55 -0.19 -0.21 0.56
Bra 0.11 -0.14 -0.45 -0.41 0.67 0.60 0.89 0.56 1.00 0.01 0.55 -0.10 0.16 0.52 0.55 0.53
Chl -0.25 -0.50 0.61 0.79 -0.17 0.35 0.06 -0.69 0.01 1.00 0.67 0.41 0.60 0.54 0.64 -0.15
Col -0.16 -0.49 0.12 0.37 0.29 0.61 0.41 -0.11 0.55 0.67 1.00 0.17 0.44 0.70 0.78 0.19
Ecu 0.34 0.13 0.69 0.61 -0.59 -0.30 -0.20 -0.52 -0.10 0.41 0.17 1.00 0.52 0.20 0.01 -0.12
Mex 0.23 -0.02 0.50 0.54 -0.37 -0.13 0.17 -0.55 0.16 0.60 0.44 0.52 1.00 0.73 0.48 0.02
Pan -0.08 -0.38 0.06 0.30 0.15 0.37 0.48 -0.19 0.52 0.54 0.70 0.20 0.73 1.00 0.77 0.27
Per -0.37 -0.62 0.07 0.32 0.36 0.67 0.53 -0.21 0.55 0.64 0.78 0.01 0.48 0.77 1.00 0.07
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Table 4 
Stationarity Test (Advanced DF test) 
 
Variable  Lags*  Augmented DF test  Result** 
GRA 1  -0.11  I(0) 
Argentina 2  1.00  I(0) 
Brazil 0  -0.49  I(0) 
Chile 0  -0.94  I(0) 
Colombia 2  -0.55  I(0) 
Ecuador 1  -0.57  I(0) 
México 1  -0.77  I(0) 
Panama 2  -0.24  I(0) 
Perú 2  -0.32  I(0) 
Venezuela 1  -0.51  I(0) 
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SVAR of US growth 
1/, US government long-term interest rate 
2/, GRA and Latin 
American sovereign spreads 
   Argentina Brazil  Chile  Mexico Peru  Venezuela Panama  Colombia Ecuador 
                 
  C2  0.098**  0.097** 0.129** 0.105** 0.109** 0.099**  0.094**  0.086  0.106** 
  C4  -0.017  -0.019 -0.044 -0.013 -0.025 -0.010  -0.032  -0.060**  -0.016 
  C5  -0.313**  -0.300** -0.399** -0.319** -0.378** -0.309**  -0.369**  -0.375**  -0.340** 
  C7  0.006  -0.021 0.021  -0.009 -0.006 -0.008  -0.010  -0.030**  -0.007 
  C8  -0.047 -0.032  -0.160**  -0.109**  -0.072*  -0.027  -0.072**  -0.083**  -0.034 
  C9  0.060  0.179** 0.293** 0.116*  0.153** 0.083  0.124**  0.087**  0.125** 
  C1  0.481**  0.484** 0.527** 0.475** 0.474** 0.469**  0.506**  0.514**  0.484** 
  C3  0.217**  0.203** 0.214** 0.215** 0.224** 0.217**  0.211**  0.237**  0.213** 
  C6  0.093**  0.093** 0.109** 0.093** 0.102** 0.092**  0.101**  0.109**  0.094** 
  C10  0.062**  0.071** 0.071** 0.064** 0.057** 0.055**  0.053**  0.032**  0.046** 
Log likelihood   191.886  183.228 68.641  190.222 129.595 207.853  150.078  104.466  206.063 
  * Significant at 10% level 
  ** Significant at 5% level 
 
1/ Proxied by Conference Board confidence indicator 
 



















SVAR of US confidence indicator 
1/, US short term interest rate 
2/, GRA and Latin 
American sovereign spreads 
   Argentina Brazil  Chile  Mexico Peru  Venezuela Panama  Colombia Ecuador 
                 
  C2  -0.022  -0.027 -0.073 -0.020 -0.020 -0.023  -0.017  -0.091**  -0.044** 
  C4  -0.054**  -0.056** -0.132** -0.047** -0.089** -0.053**  -0.085**  -0.144**  -0.063** 
  C5  0.049  0.096 0.140 0.078 0.176 0.070  0.170  -0.051  0.200 
  C7  -0.001  -0.020 0.035  -0.012 -0.005 -0.008  -0.007  -0.008  -0.002 
  C8  0.078  0.026 0.090 0.008 -0.023  0.064  0.061  0.122**  0.056 
  C9  0.113**  0.216** 0.432** 0.216** 0.251** 0.109**  0.173**  0.225**  0.137** 
  C1  0.486**  0.490** 0.482** 0.478** 0.486** 0.479**  0.497**  0.543**  0.484** 
  C3  0.117**  0.118** 0.141** 0.115** 0.116** 0.115**  0.112**  0.112**  0.098** 
  C6  0.117**  0.114** 0.152** 0.116** 0.135** 0.116**  0.129**  0.135**  0.121** 
  C10  0.062**  0.072** 0.063** 0.069** 0.056** 0.057**  0.059**  0.031**  0.049** 
Log likelihood   221.975  208.573 75.158  216.103 148.774 235.230  164.807  116.788  240.300 
  * Significant at 10% level 
  ** Significant at 5% level 
 
1/ Proxied by Conference Board confidence indicator 
 








ARGENTINA: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US government bond yield 
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Table 2 
ARGENTINA: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US short-term interest rate 
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Table 3 
BRAZIL: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US government bond yield 
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Table 4 
BRAZIL: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US short-term interest rate 
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Table 5 
CHILE: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US government bond yield 
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Table 6 
CHILE: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US short-term interest rate 
2/, GRA and sovereign spread 
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Table 7 
COLOMBIA: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US government bond yield 
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Table 8 
COLOMBIA: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US short-term interest rate 
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Table 9 
ECUADOR: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US government bond yield 
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Table 10 
ECUADOR: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US short-term interest rate 
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Table 11 
MEXICO: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US government bond yield 
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Table 12 
MEXICO: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US short-term interest rate 
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Table 13 
PANAMA: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US government bond yield 
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Table 14 
PANAMA: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US short-term interest rate 
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Table 15 
PERU: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US government bond yield 
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Table 16 
PERU: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US short-term interest rate 
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Table 17 
VENEZUELA: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US government bond yield 
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Table 18 
VENEZUELA: Impulse response functions US growth 
1/, US short-term interest rate 
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